recourse in general
either to stratagem or to blockade. Occasionally they employed the
destructive force of fire, and no doubt they often succeeded by the
common method of escalade. On the whole, it must certainly be said that
they were successful in their sieges, exhibiting in their conduct of
them courage, activity, and considerable fertility of resource.

A Persian army was usually, though not always, placed under a single
commander. This commander was the monarch, if he was present; if not, it
was a Persian, or a Mede, nominated by him. Under the commander-in-chief
were a number of general officers, heads of corps or divisions, of whom
we find, in one instance, as many as nine. Next in rank to these were
the chiefs of the various ethnic contingents composing the army, who
were, probably, in general the satraps of the different provinces. Thus
far appointments were held directly from the crown; but beyond this the
system was changed. The ethnic or satrapial commanders appointed the
officers next below themselves, the captains over a thousand, and (if
their contingent was large enough to admit it) the captains over ten
thousand; who, again, nominated their subordinates, commanders of a
hundred, and commanders of ten. Thus, in the main, a decimal scale
prevailed. The lowest rank of officers commanded each ten men, the next
lowest a hundred, the next to that a thousand, the next ten thousand.
The officer over ten thousand was sometimes a divisional chief;
sometimes he was subject to the commander of an ethnic contingent, who
was himself under the orders of the head of a division. Altogether there
were six ranks of officers, exclusive of the commander-in-chief.

The proper position of the commander-in-chief was considered to be the
centre of the line of battle. He was regarded as safer there than
he would have been on either wing; and it was seen that, from such a
position, his orders would be most rapidly conveyed to all parts of the
battlefield. It was not, however, thought to be honorable that he should
keep aloof from the fight, or avoid risking his own person. On the
contrary, he was expected to take an active part in the combat; and
therefore, though his place was not exactly in the very foremost ranks,
it was towards the front, and the result followed that he was often
exposed to imminent danger. The consequences of this arrangement
were frequently disastrous in the extreme, the death or flight of the
commander