ruction, and that nothing is to be hoped from
ploughmen and manufacturers, commanded by schoolboys. The success of the
expedition is not so much considered by those who have the direction of
the levies, as that of the election, and while they keep their posts,
they are very little concerned about the affairs of America.

In defence of this method, it has, indeed, been affirmed, that it was
preferred by the duke of MARLBOROUGH; but we are not informed to whom,
or upon what occasion he declared his opinion, and, therefore, are left
at liberty to doubt, whether his authority is not produced for a method
which he did not approve, or approved only at some particular time for
some extraordinary service.

It is urged, that he recommended it by his practice, and that his
success is a sufficient proof that his practice was founded upon right
maxims. But if it be remembered what was, in that time, the method of
obtaining commissions, and who it was that had the disposal of them, it
will appear not absolutely certain, that his practice ought to be
produced as a decisive proof of his opinion.

If the success of troops be properly urged as an argument for the form
of their establishment, may not the victories of prince Eugene afford a
proof, equally convincing, that a few officers are sufficient? And if
the arguments which arise from success are equal on both sides, ought
not the necessity of saving the publick money to turn the balance?

War, sir, is in its own nature a calamity very grievous to the most
powerful and flourishing people, and to a trading nation is particularly
destructive, as it at once exhausts our wealth, and interrupts our
commerce, at once drinks up the stream and chokes up the fountain. In
those countries whose affairs are wholly transacted within their own
frontiers, where there is either very little money, or where their
wealth is dug out of their own mines, they are only weakened by the loss
of men, or by the diminution of their dominions, and, in general, can
only suffer by being overcome.

But the state of Britain is far different; it is not necessary to our
ruin that an enemy should be stronger than ourselves, that he should be
able to pour armies into our country, to cover the sea with fleets, to
burn our villages by incursions, or destroy our fortresses with bombs;
for he that can secure his own dominions from our attacks, to which
nothing but distance and some advantages of situation are necessary,