no certain proofs of the inefficacy or imperfection of the other.

But experience, sir, may be extended much farther than our own personal
transactions, and may very justly comprehend those observations which we
have had opportunities of making upon the conduct and success of others.
This gentleman, though he has only commanded in the armies of Britain,
has seen the forces of other nations, has remarked their regulations,
and heard of their actions with our confederates in the last war; he has
probably acted in conjunction, and though it is known that they differ
from us in the proportion of soldiers and officers, he has mentioned no
disadvantage which might be supposed to arise from their establishment,
and therefore, I suppose, he cannot deny that their behaviour and
success was the same with that of our own troops.

The battles of Almanza, Parma, and Guastalla, which he has particularly
mentioned, were lost, as he informs us, by armies not officered
according to the establishment which he recommends to us: but it is
observable that his argument is defective in an essential part; for
though he affirms that the armies which were defeated had fewer officers
than the enemy, he has neither shown, nor attempted to show, that the
want of officers occasioned the defeat, or that the loss would have been
prevented by a greater number.

These instances, therefore, can be of no effect on the determination of
the present question; for though it is certain that at Germany, and at
other places, armies with few officers have lost the battle, it is not
less common for those troops that are more liberally supplied, to be
overthrown by others which are differently modelled.

With regard, sir, to the troops of Germany, I have heard them praised,
in many parts of Europe, as not inferiour either to those of France, or
of any other nation, and have been informed, that their ill success,
both at Parma and Guastalla, may be justly imputed to other causes than
the want of officers.

There has, perhaps, sir, seldom been an example of firmness, discipline,
and resolution, beyond that which was shown by the Germans at the action
of Parma, where they attacked the trenches of the French, sustained the
fire of the ramparts of the city, and though they lost their
commander-in-chief and two others, towards the beginning of the action,
they continued the fight for eleven hours, and at last retired only at
the approach of night.

At Guastalla, s