obvious that neither disputant has the means whereby
to estimate the actual value of these antecedent objections.

With regard, then, to the _a posteriori_ evidence in favour of the rival
theories, I think that the final test of their validity--_i.e._, the
inconceivability of their respective negations--fails equally in the case
of both theories; for in the case of each theory any proposition which
embodies it must itself contain an infinite, _i.e._, an
inconceivable--term. Thus, whether we speak of an Infinite Mind as the
cause of evolution, or of evolution as due to an infinite duration of
physical processes, we are alike open to the charge of employing
unthinkable propositions.

Hence, two unthinkables are presented to our choice; one of which is an
eternity of matter and of force,[32] and the other an Infinite Mind, so
that in this respect again the two theories are tolerably parallel; and
therefore, all that can be concluded with rigorous certainty upon the
subject is, that neither theory has anything to gain us against the other
from an appeal to the test of inconceivability.

Yet we have seen that this is a test than which none can be more ultimate.
What then shall we say is the final outcome of this discussion concerning
the rational standing of the teleological argument? The answer, I think, to
this question is, that in strict reasoning the teleological argument, in
its every shape, is inadequate to form a basis of Theism; or, in other
words, that the logical cogency of this argument is insufficient to justify
a wholly impartial mind in accepting the theory of Theism on so insecure a
foundation. Nevertheless, if the further question were directly put to me,
'After having heard the pleading both for and against the most refined
expression of the argument from teleology, with what degree of strictly
rational probability do you accredit it?'--I should reply as follows:--'The
question which you put I take to be a question which it is wholly
impossible to answer, and this for the simple reason that the degree of
even rational probability may here legitimately vary with the character of
the mind which contemplates it.' This statement, no doubt, sounds
paradoxical; but I think it is justified by the following considerations.
When we say that one proposition is more conceivable than another, we may
mean either of two very different things, and this quite apart from the
distinction previously drawn between symbolic con