tretch of
inference so outrageous that the argument had to be pronounced worthless.
Proceeding next to examine the less superficial arguments in favour of
Theism, it was first shown that the syllogism, All known minds are caused
by an unknown mind; our mind is a known mind; therefore our mind is caused
by an unknown mind,--is a syllogism that is inadmissible for two reasons.
In the first place, "it does not account for mind (in the abstract) to
refer it to a prior mind for its origin;" and therefore, although the
hypothesis, if admitted, would be _an_ explanation of _known_ mind, it is
useless as an argument for the existence of the unknown mind, the
assumption of which forms the basis of that explanation. Again, in the next
place, if it be said that mind is so far an entity _sui generis_ that it
must be either self-existing or caused by another mind, there is no
assignable warrant for the assertion. And this is the second objection to
the above syllogism; for anything within the whole range of the possible
may, for aught that we can tell, be competent to produce a self-conscious
intelligence. Thus an objector to the above syllogism need not hold any
theory of things at all; but even as opposed to the definite theory of
materialism, the above syllogism has not so valid an argumentative basis to
stand upon. We know that what we call matter and force are to all
appearance eternal, while we have no corresponding evidence of a "mind that
is even apparently eternal." Further, within experience mind is invariably
associated with highly differentiated collocations of matter and
distributions of force, and many facts go to prove, and none to negative,
the conclusion that the grade of intelligence invariably depends upon, or
at least is associated with, a corresponding grade of cerebral development.
There is thus both a qualitative and a quantitative relation between
intelligence and cerebral organisation. And if it is said that matter and
motion cannot produce consciousness because it is inconceivable that they
should, we have seen at some length that this is no conclusive
consideration as applied to a subject of a confessedly transcendental
nature, and that in the present case it is particularly inconclusive,
because, as it is speculatively certain that the substance of mind must be
unknowable, it seems _a priori_ probable that, whatever is the cause of the
unknowable reality, this cause should be more difficult to render into
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