land. Pondicherry was the only East
Indian possession which the genius of Clive allowed her to retain. By
the Treaty of Paris, of 1763, she was compelled to relinquish Canada in
order to regain her West Indian islands conquered by England.[4]

Vainly, under good or bad, weak or potent sovereigns, did France
attempt the enlargement of her empire or an increase of national power.
England, on one pretence or another, always confronted her, and by
successful war, or unscrupulous diplomacy, baffled her designs.

The English mind was cultivated throughout the eighteenth century into
the belief that every accession to France was a menace and an injury to
England.

At last the French Revolution, inspiring with preternatural energy that
gallant people, turned the tide of events so long adverse to French
aggrandizement. Still true to her hereditary hostility, England combined
all Europe to resist the aggression of republican France. But soon, from
the raging elements of that awful convulsion, the 'Man of Destiny'
arose, who could 'ride the whirlwind and direct the storm.' He seized
the helm, evoked order from chaos, and smote the enemies of France
wherever they appeared, revived the splendors of her early history, and,
like her mediaeval Charlemagne, gave the law to Europe.

England took the measure of Napoleon, and recognized in him an enemy
whom she must subdue at any cost, or submit to be reduced in the scale
of nations to that importance and those proportions befitting her
diminutive territory in Europe.

The battle of Marengo--the Peace of Luneville--the ascendency of
Napoleon on the continent--the defection of the continental allies of
England--and the preparations of Napoleon for her invasion, led to the
Treaty of Amiens.

That treaty, however, was only a brief truce, which England never
designed to observe but temporarily. She refused to respect its
obligations, and even to negotiate for its modification. She feared that
peace would enable Napoleon to rebuild his shattered navy.

Lord Hawkesbury's note of March 15th, 1803, assigned as her avowed
reason for the renewal of the war--'the acquisition made by France in
various quarters, particularly in Italy, and therefore England would be
justified in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions as a
counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France.'[5]

This note of Lord Hawkesbury avows distinctly the spirit of the foreign
policy of England for the last two h