quest which the first Napoleon ever threatened in Europe would have
so strengthened France as would the annexation of Mexico to her
dominions. But England has expended in her wars with the first Napoleon,
to restrain him from acquisitions which could not have materially
injured England, all her resources for war. She is not in the condition
to wage such wars with France as she prosecuted during the last and the
beginning of the present century. She knows that she must acquiesce in
the ambitious acquisitions of the present Napoleon, or else encounter
his hostility. Cherbourg and the steam navy of France render an invasion
of the British Isles a more practicable achievement for the present
Napoleon than ever the first Napoleon could hope for. England shrinks,
therefore, from any effort to curb the present aggrandizement of France,
from _fear_. She ignominiously renounces and abandons the policy of her
monarchy, her aristocracy, and her people--pursued for two hundred years
with unfaltering pertinacity; not because she condemns it, not because
she does not feel 'justified' in resisting French acquisitions unless
'equivalents for these acquisitions as a counterpoise to the
augmentation of the power of France' are obtained; but obviously,
because she fears to encounter the arms of the present Napoleon.

When the French emperor forced upon the acceptance of Lord Aberdeen's
cabinet 'the harsh and insulting scheme of action' (as Kinglake calls
it) which provoked the war with Russia in 1854, England's dilemma was: a
war with Nicholas, or a rupture with France. 'The negotiation which had
seemed to be almost ripe for a settlement was then ruined.'[6]

A war for Napoleon at that time with one of the great powers, was a
necessity. It was necessary for the stability of his throne. It was
necessary to prevent the thoughts of France from dwelling upon the
assassination of the republic and her own infamy in submitting to that
enormous villany. If it had not been Russia, it would have been England
that the imperial usurper would have denounced as disturbing the waters
for his provocation.

Mellowed by time, and enlightened by their deplorable results, England
now views the wars with Napoleon the First in their true light. So far
from British power having been augmented by that tremendous struggle, it
has compelled England to descend from the position of a first-rate to
that of a second-rate power, so far as it concerns the politics of