y doth it secretly, or being charged with the
goods denies it."

(1 Hales P.C. 509.)

I concede, that if Miss Anthony voted, knowing that as a woman she had
no right to vote, she may properly be convicted, and that if she had
dressed herself in men's apparel, and assumed a man's name, or resorted
to any other artifice to deceive the board of inspectors, the jury might
properly regard her claim of right, to be merely colorable, and might,
in their judgment, pronounce her guilty of the offence charged, in case
the constitution has not secured to her the right she claimed. All I
claim is, that if she voted in perfect good faith, believing that it was
her right, she has committed no crime. An innocent mistake, whether of
law or fact, though a wrongful act may be done in pursuance of it,
cannot constitute a crime.

[The following cases and authorities were referred to and commented upon
by the counsel, as sustaining his positions: _U.S. vs. Conover, 3
McLean's Rep. 573; The State vs. McDonald, 4 Harrington, 555; The State
vs. Homes, 17 Mo. 379; Rex vs. Hall, 3 C. & P. 409, (S.C. 14 Eng. C.L.);
The Queen vs. Reed, 1 C. & M. 306. (S.C. 41 Eng. C.L.); Lancaster's
Case, 3 Leon. 208; Starkie on Ev., Part IV, Vol. 2, p. 828, 3d Am. Ed._]

The counsel then said, there are some cases which I concede cannot be
reconciled with the position which I have endeavoured to maintain, and I
am sorry to say that one of them is found in the reports of this State.
As the other cases are referred to in that, and the principle, if they
can be said to stand on any principle, is in all of them the same, it
will only be incumbent on me to notice that one. That case is not only
irreconcilable with the numerous authorities and the fundamental
principles of criminal law to which I have referred, but the enormity of
its injustice is sufficient alone to condemn it. I refer to the case of
_Hamilton vs. The People_, (_57 Barb. 725_). In that case Hamilton had
been convicted of a misdemeanor, in having voted at a general election,
after having been previously convicted of a felony and sentenced to two
years imprisonment in the state prison, and not having been pardoned;
the conviction having by law deprived him of citizenship and right to
vote, unless pardoned and restored to citizenship. The case came up
before the General Term of the Supreme Court, on writ of error. It
appeared that on the trial evidence was offered, that before the
prisoner