n, and the place of occasional resort for their fiercest
spirits, even there a revolution is not likely to have anything to feed
it. The leaders of the aristocratic party have been drawn out of the
kingdom by order of the princes, on the hopes held out by the Emperor
and the king of Prussia at Pilnitz; and as to the democratic factions in
Paris, amongst them there are no leaders possessed of an influence for
any other purpose but that of maintaining the present state of things.
The moment they are seen to warp, they are reduced to nothing. They have
no attached army,--no party that is at all personal.

It is not to be imagined, because a political system is, under certain
aspects, very unwise in its contrivance, and very mischievous in its
effects, that it therefore can have no long duration. Its very defects
may tend to its stability, because they are agreeable to its nature. The
very faults in the Constitution of Poland made it last; the _veto_ which
destroyed all its energy preserved its life. What can be conceived so
monstrous as the republic of Algiers, and that no less strange republic
of the Mamelukes in Egypt? They are of the worst form imaginable, and
exercised in the worst manner, yet they have existed as a nuisance on
the earth for several hundred years.

[Sidenote: Conclusions.]

From all these considerations, and many more that crowd upon me, three
conclusions have long since arisen in my mind.

First, that no counter revolution is to be expected in France from
internal causes solely.

Secondly, that, the longer the present system exists, the greater will
be its strength, the greater its power to destroy discontents at home,
and to resist all foreign attempts in favor of these discontents.

Thirdly, that, as long as it exists in France, it will be the interest
of the managers there, and it is in the very essence of their plan, to
disturb and distract all other governments, and their endless succession
of restless politicians will continually stimulate them to new attempts.

[Sidenote: Proceedings of princes; defensive plans.]

Princes are generally sensible that this is their common cause; and two
of them have made a public declaration of their opinion to this effect.
Against this common danger, some of them, such as the king of Spain, the
king of Sardinia, and the republic of Bern, are very diligent in using
defensive measures.

If they were to guard against an invasion from France, the merits of