and to make
some addition by land.

Seventhly, To acknowledge the king of France's next brother (assisted by
such a council and such representatives of the kingdom of France as
shall be thought proper) regent of France, and to send that prince a
small supply of money, arms, clothing, and artillery.

Eighthly, To give force to these negotiations, an instant naval armament
ought to be adopted,--one squadron for the Mediterranean, another for
the Channel. The season is convenient,--most of our trade being, as I
take it, at home.

After speaking of a plan formed upon the ancient policy and practice of
Great Britain and of Europe, to which this is exactly conformable in
every respect, with no deviation whatsoever, and which is, I conceive,
much more strongly called for by the present circumstances than by any
former, I must take notice of another, which I hear, but cannot persuade
myself to believe, is in agitation. This plan is grounded upon the very
same view of things which is here stated,--namely, the danger to all
sovereigns, and old republics, from the prevalence of French power and
influence.

It is, to form a congress of all the European powers for the purpose of
a general defensive alliance, the objects of which should be,--

First, The recognition of this new republic, (which they well know is
formed on the principles and for the declared purpose of the destruction
of all kings,) and, whenever the heads of this new republic shall
consent to release the royal captives, to make peace with them.

Secondly, To defend themselves with their joint forces against the open
aggressions, or the secret practices, intrigues, and writings, which are
used to propagate the French principles.

It is easy to discover from whose shop this commodity comes. It is so
perfectly absurd, that, if that or anything like it meets with a serious
entertainment in any cabinet, I should think it the effect of what is
called a judicial blindness, the certain forerunner of the destruction
of all crowns and kingdoms.

An _offensive_ alliance, in which union is preserved by common efforts
in common dangers against a common active enemy, may preserve its
consistency, and may produce for a given time some considerable effect:
though this is not easy, and for any very long period can hardly be
expected. But a _defensive_ alliance, formed of long discordant
interests, with innumerable discussions existing, having no one pointed
object to which