livered over to the gallows. It was not necessary that the
emigrant nobility and gentry who served with the king of Prussia's army,
under his immediate command, should be excluded from the cartel, and
given up to be hanged as rebels. Never was so gross and so cruel a
breach of the public faith, not with an enemy, but with a friend.
Dumouriez has dropped very singular hints. Custine has spoken out more
broadly. These accounts have never been contradicted. They tend to make
an eternal rupture between the powers. The French have given out, that
the Duke of Brunswick endeavored to negotiate some name and place for
the captive king, amongst the murderers and proscribers of those who
have lost their all for his cause. Even this has not been denied.

It is singular, and, indeed, a thing, under all its circumstances,
inconceivable, that everything should by the Emperor be abandoned to the
king of Prussia. That monarch was considered as principal. In the nature
of things, as well as in his position with regard to the war, he was
only an ally, and a new ally, with crossing interests in many
particulars, and of a policy rather uncertain. At best, and supposing
him to act with the greatest fidelity, the Emperor and the Empire to him
must be but secondary objects. Countries out of Germany must affect him
in a still more remote manner. France, other than from the fear of its
doctrinal principles, can to him be no object at all. Accordingly, the
Rhine, Sardinia, and the Swiss are left to their fate. The king of
Prussia has no _direct_ and immediate concern with France;
_consequentially_, to be sure, a great deal: but the Emperor touches
France _directly_ in many parts; he is a near neighbor to Sardinia, by
his Milanese territories; he borders on Switzerland; Cologne, possessed
by his uncle, is between Mentz, Treves, and the king of Prussia's
territories on the Lower Rhine. The Emperor is the natural guardian of
Italy and Germany,--the natural balance against the ambition of France,
whether republican or monarchical. His ministers and his generals,
therefore, ought to have had their full share in every material
consultation,--which I suspect they had not. If he has no minister
capable of plans of policy which comprehend the superintendency of a
war, or no general with the least of a political head, things have been
as they must be. However, in all the parts of this strange proceeding
there must be a secret.

It is probably known to mi