nd hardly know of, such
rules and systems. Their governments are arbitrary; the objects of their
policy are always shifting; they have no regular established system, the
effect of which is to protect the weak against the strong; on the
contrary, the object of each of them separately, and of all of them
taken collectively, is to destroy the weak; and if by chance, they
should, by a sense of common danger, be induced for a season to combine
their efforts for their mutual defence, the combination lasts only so
long as it is attended with success; the first reverse dissolves it;
and, at all events, it is dissolved long before the danger ceases, the
apprehension of which originally caused it. The company's government in
India, the other contracting party to their alliance, is one bound by
all the rules and systems of European policy. The company's power in
India is supposed to depend much upon its reputation; and although I do
not admit that it depends upon its reputation, as distinguished from its
real force, as appears to be contended by some, I may say that it is
particularly desirable for a government, so constituted as the
company's, never to enter upon any particular object, the probable
result of which should not be greatly in favour of success.

Besides this, the company's government in India is bound by acts of
parliament not to undertake wars of aggression, not to make any but
defensive alliances, and those only in cases in which the other
contracting party shall bind itself to defend the possessions of the
company actually threatened with hostilities.

The company's government in India is also connected with his majesty's
government, and, as an Asiatic power, is liable to be involved in wars
with European powers possessing territories in India, whenever his
majesty shall be at war with those powers.

The picture above drawn of the state of politics among Asiatic powers,
proves that no permanent system can be adopted which will preserve the
weak against the strong, and will keep all for any length of time in
their relative situations, and the whole in peace; excepting there
should be one power, which, either by the superiority of its strength,
its military system, or its resources, shall preponderate, and be able
to protect all.

_1804._

* * * * *

It is necessary for a man who fills a public situation, and who has
great public interests in charge, to lay aside all private
co