as gall and wormwood to them. It was also a menace to the cause with
which they were identified. None the less, they accepted the inevitable
for the moment, pitched their voices in a lower key, and decided to
approve the Rumanian thesis that Neo-Bolshevism in Hungary must be no
longer bolstered up,[151] but be squashed vicariously. They accordingly
invited the representatives of the three little countries on which the
honor of waging these humanitarian wars in the anarchist east of Europe
was to be conferred, and sounded them as to their willingness to put
their soldiers in the field, and how many as to the numbers available.
M. Bratiano offered eight divisions. The Czechoslovaks did not relish
the project, but after some delay and fencing around agreed to furnish a
contingent, whereas the Jugoslavs met the demand with a plain negative,
which was afterward changed to acquiescence when the Council promised to
keep the Italians from attacking them. As things turned out, none but
the Rumanians actually fought the Hungarian Reds. Meanwhile the members
of the American, British, and Italian missions in Hungary endeavored to
reach a friendly agreement with the criminal gang in Budapest.

The plan of campaign decided on had Marshal Foch for its author. It was,
therefore, business-like. He demanded a quarter of a million men,[152]
to which it was decided that Rumania should contribute 120,000,
Jugoslavia 50,000, and Czechoslovakia as many as she could conveniently
afford. But the day before the preparations were to have begun,[153]
Bela Kuhn flung his troops[154] against the Rumanians with initial
success, drove them across the Tisza with considerable loss, took up
commanding positions, and struck dismay into the members of the Supreme
Council. The Semitic Dictator, with grim humor, explained to the
crestfallen lawgivers, who were once more at fault, that a wanton breach
of the peace was alien to his thoughts; that, on the contrary, his
motive for action deserved high praise--it was to compel the rebellious
Rumanians to obey the behest of the Conference and withdraw to their
frontiers. The plenipotentiaries bore this gibe with dignity, and
decided to have recourse once more to their favorite, and, indeed, only
method--the despatch of exhortative telegrams. Of more efficacious means
they were destitute. This time their message, which lacked a definite
address, was presumably intended for the anti-Bolshevist population of
Hungary,