ea has been surrendered, which, in its
turn, will be debated, word for word, by the Institut de Droit
International.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
T. E. HOLLAND.
Oxford, November 4 (1913).

* * * * *

SECTION 13

_Martial Law_

The first of the letters which follow has reference to the case
of two Boer prisoners who, having taken the oath of neutrality
on the British occupation of Pretoria, attempted to escape from
the town. Both were armed, and one of them fired upon and
wounded a sentinel who called upon them to stop. They were
tried by court-martial, condemned to death, and shot on June
11, 1901. The Hague Convention quoted in the letter is that of
1899, but the same Art. 8 figures in the Convention of 1907.

The second and third of these letters relate to a question of
English public law, growing out of the exercise of martial law
in British territory in time of war. One Marais, accused of
having contravened the martial law regulations of May 1, 1901,
was imprisoned in Cape Colony by military authority, and the
Supreme Court at the Cape held that it had no authority to
order his release. The Privy Council refused an application for
leave to appeal against this decision, saying that "no doubt
has ever existed that, when war actually prevails, the ordinary
courts have no jurisdiction over the action of the military
authorities"; adding that "the framers of the Petition of Right
knew well what they meant when they made a condition of peace
the ground of the illegality of unconstitutional procedure"
(_Ex parte_ D.F. Marais, [1902] A.C. 109). Thereupon arose a
discussion as to the extent of the prohibition of the exercise
of martial law contained in the Petition of Right; and Mr.
Edward Jenks, in letters to _The Times_ of December 27, 1901,
and January 4, 1902, maintained that the prohibition in
question was not confined to time of peace.

The last letter deals with the true character of a Proclamation
of Martial Law, and was suggested by the refusal of the Privy
Council, on April 2, 1906, to grant leave to appeal from
sentences passed in Natal by court-martial, in respect of acts
committed on February 8, 1906, whereby retrospective effect
had, it was alleged, been given to a proclamation not issued
till the day after the acts were committe