e of
argument followed by the supporters of the Petition in the House of
Commons. Can Mr. Jenks really suppose that in making this remark I was
"appealing from the 'text of the Petition' to the debates in
Parliament"?

I then proceeded to deal very shortly with the Petition itself, showing
that while it neither condemns nor approves of the application of
martial law in time of war (see Lord Blackburn's observations in R. _v._
Eyre), the prohibition contained in its martial law clauses, so far from
being "absolute and unqualified," relates exclusively to "commissions of
like nature" with certain commissions which had been lately issued (at a
time which admittedly, for the purposes of this discussion, was not "a
time of war"), the text of which is still preserved, and the character
of which is set forth in the Petition itself, as having authorised
proceedings within the land, "according to the justice of martial law,
against such soldiers or mariners," as also against "such other
dissolute persons joining with them," &c. The description of these
commissions, be it observed, is not merely introduced into the Petition
by way of recital, but is incorporated by express reference into the
enacting clause.

Thus much and no more I thought it desirable to say upon these two
topics by way of dissent from a letter of Mr. Jenks upon the subject. In
a second letter Mr. Jenks rides off into fresh country. I do not propose
to follow him into the history of the conferences which took place in
May, 1628, after the framing of the Petition of Right, except to remark
that what passed at these conferences is irrelevant to the
interpretation to be placed upon the Petition, and, if relevant, would
be opposed to Mr. Jenks's contention. It is well known that the Lords
pressed the Commons to introduce various amendments into the Petition
and to add to it the famous reservation of the "sovereign power" of the
King. One of the proposed amendments referred, as Mr. Jenks says, to
martial law, forbidding its application to "any but soldiers and
mariners," or "in time of peace, or when your Majesty's Army is not on
foot." The Commons' objection to this seems to have been that it was
both unnecessary and obscurely expressed. "Their complaint is against
commissions in time of peace." "It may be a time of peace, and yet his
Majesty's Army may be on foot, and that martial law was not lawful here
in England in time of peace, when the Chancery and other C