rnment, abstention is almost
impossible.

The chief danger in our relations with certain Latin-American countries
lies in this political instability and unripeness that makes property
and life unsafe and the administration of justice notoriously corrupt.
The result is extortion, bribery and violence clothed in legal form.
Investors and creditors plead for intervention to enforce contracts,
sometimes of doubtful validity, sometimes obviously dishonest. To meet
the problems arising from such claims, we should have more information.
Our Bureau of Foreign Commerce should ask for data concerning American
investments abroad and especially in Latin America. Such information,
supplied in the first instance by the corporations, should be verified
by official investigations. There should be full publicity. Our
consular representatives should not seek to secure special privileges
or business orders, and our governmental influence should guarantee
equal economic opportunities to all nations. No claim by Americans
should be enforced until it has been reported upon favourably by a
court of arbitration composed of representatives of nations with no
interest in the controversy.

{212}

Whether the United States should seek the aid of England or of some
other European power in the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine or
should endeavour to internationalise the doctrine by gaining the
adhesion of all nations, or should support the doctrine with the aid of
the Latin-American countries alone is a question the answer to which
will depend upon the future attitude of European nations, and
especially upon the relation of the United States to those nations.
The difficulty of securing an international guarantee lies in the
necessary vagueness of the doctrine. In the present state of mind
concerning international guarantees, there is perhaps more immediate
advantage in a special guardianship by the United States, the
Argentine, Brazil and Chile, especially as in the case of an assault
upon the doctrine by one or more European powers, the assistance of
other European nations could probably be obtained. The important
consideration at present is that the strength of the doctrine will be
in direct proportion to the disinterestedness of the United States.
The more clearly the doctrine can be made to serve the common interests
of the world instead of the special interests of a single country, the
more likely is it to secure the support in any