; but it is in man's nature to
revolt at self-destruction. When a person is predetermined
upon the commission of this crime, the seasonable
admonitions of a discreet and respected friend would
probably tend to overthrow his determination. On the other
hand, the counsel of an unprincipled wretch, stating the
heroism and courage the self-murderer displays, might
induce, encourage, and fix the intention, and ultimately
procure the perpetration of the dreadful deed; and if other
men would be influenced by such advice, the presumption is
that Jewett was so influenced. He might have been influenced
by many powerful motives to destroy himself. Still the
inducements might have been insufficient to procure the
actual commission of the act, and one word of additional
advice might have turned the scale.'

"When applied--as this ruling seems to have been here
applied--to a case in which the advice was nearly connected,
in point of time, with the criminal act, it is, in my
opinion, correct. If the advice was intended by the giver to
stir or incite to a crime--if it was of such a nature as to
be adapted to have this effect, and the persons incited
immediately afterwards committed that crime--it is a just
presumption that they were influenced by the advice or
incitement to commit it. The circumstances, or direct proof,
may or may not be sufficient to control this presumption;
and whether they are so, can duly be determined in each
case, upon all its evidence.

"One other rule of law on this subject is necessary to be
borne in mind--the substantive offence to which the advice
or incitement applied must have been committed; and it is
for that alone the adviser or procurer is legally
accountable. Thus if one should counsel another to rescue
one prisoner, and he should rescue another, unless by
mistake; or if the incitement was to rescue a prisoner, and
he commit a larceny, the inciter is not responsible. But it
need not appear _that the precise time, or place, or means
advised_, were used. Thus if one incite A. to murder B., but
advise him to wait until B. shall be at a certain place at
noon, and A. murders B. at a different place in the morning,
the adviser is guilty. So if the incitement be to poison,
and the murderer shoots, or stabs