FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   175   176   177   178   179   180   181   182   183   184   185   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199  
200   201   202   203   204   205   206   207   208   209   210   211   212   213   214   215   216   217   218   219   220   221   222   223   224   >>   >|  
self to our senses, we can not avoid the conviction that it must have a cause. We can not even express in language the relations of phenomena in time and space, without speaking of causes. And there is not a rational being on the face of the globe--a child, a savage, or a philosopher--who does not instinctively and spontaneously affirm that every movement, every change, every new existence, _must_ have a cause. Now what account can philosophy render of this universal belief? One answer, and only one, is possible. The _reason_ of man (that power of which Comte takes no account) is in fixed and changeless relation to the principle of causation, just as _sense_ is in fixed and changeless relation to exterior phenomena, so that we can not know the external world, can not think or speak of phenomenal existence, except as _effects_. In the expressive and forcible language of Jas. Martineau: "By an irresistible law of thought _all phenomena present themselves to us as the expression of power_, and refer us to a causal ground whence they issue. This dynamic source we neither see, nor hear, nor feel; it is given in _thought_, supplied by the spontaneous activity of mind as the correlative prefix to the phenomena observed."[251] Unless, then, we are prepared to deny the validity of all our rational intuitions, we can not avoid accepting "this subjective postulate as a valid law for objective nature." If the intuitions of our reason are pronounced deceptive and mendacious, so also must the intuitions of the senses be pronounced illusory and false. Our whole intellectual constitution is built up on false and erroneous principles, and all knowledge of whatever kind must perish by "the contagion of uncertainty." [Footnote 251: "Essays," p. 47.] Comte, however, is determined to treat the idea of causation as an illusion, whether under its psychological form, as _will_, or under its scientific form, as _force_. He feels that Theology is inevitable if we permit the inquiry into causes;[252] and he is more anxious that theology should perish than that truth should prevail. The human will must, therefore, be robbed of all semblance of freedom, lest it should suggest the idea of a Supreme Will governing nature; and human action, like all other phenomena, must be reduced to uniform and necessary law. All feelings, ideas, and principles guaranteed to us by consciousness are to be cast out of the account. Psychology, resting on self-obser
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   175   176   177   178   179   180   181   182   183   184   185   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199  
200   201   202   203   204   205   206   207   208   209   210   211   212   213   214   215   216   217   218   219   220   221   222   223   224   >>   >|  



Top keywords:
phenomena
 

account

 
intuitions
 

changeless

 
senses
 

principles

 

relation

 
causation
 

existence

 

reason


perish
 

thought

 

rational

 

pronounced

 

language

 
nature
 

determined

 
Essays
 
deceptive
 

mendacious


illusory

 

objective

 

subjective

 

postulate

 

intellectual

 

contagion

 

uncertainty

 

knowledge

 

erroneous

 

constitution


Footnote
 

inquiry

 

action

 
reduced
 

governing

 

freedom

 

suggest

 

Supreme

 
uniform
 
Psychology

resting

 

consciousness

 
feelings
 

guaranteed

 

semblance

 

robbed

 

Theology

 

inevitable

 

permit

 

psychological