ction, and excluded
middle, _one must be admitted as necessary_. We are thus warned from
recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily co-extensive with
the horizon of our faith. And by a _wonderful revelation_, we are thus,
in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the
relative and the finite, _inspired with a belief in_ the existence of
something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible
reality."[350] Here, then, we have found the ultimate ground of our
faith in the Infinite God. It is built upon a "mental imbecility," and
buttressed up by "contradictions!"[351]

[Footnote 349: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. pp. 368, 374. With
Hamilton, the Unconditioned is a genus, of which the Infinite and
Absolute are species.]

[Footnote 350: "Discussions on Philosophy," p. 22.]

[Footnote 351: The warmest admirers of Sir William Hamilton hesitate to
apply the doctrine of the unconditioned to Cause and Free-will. See
"Mansel's Prolegom.," Note C, p. 265.]

Such a faith, however, is built upon the clouds, and the whole structure
of this philosophy is "a castle in the air"--an attempt to organize
Nescience into Science, and evoke something out of nothing. To pretend
to believe in that respecting which I can form no notion is in reality
not to believe at all. The nature which compels me to believe in the
Infinite must supply me some object upon which my belief can take hold.
We can not believe in contradictions. Our faith must be a rational
belief--a faith in the ultimate harmony and unity of all truth, in the
veracity and integrity of human reason as the organ of truth; and, above
all, a faith in the veracity of God, who is the author and illuminator
of our mental constitution. "We can not suppose that we are created
capable of intelligence in order to be made victims of delusion--that
God is a deceiver, and the root of our nature a lie."[352] We close our
review of Hamilton by remarking:

[Footnote 352: Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, p. 21.]

1. "The Law of the Conditioned," as enounced by Hamilton, is
contradictory. It predicates contradiction of two extremes, which are
asserted to be equally incomprehensible and incognizable. If they are
utterly incognizable, how does Hamilton _know_ that they are
contradictory? The mutual _relation_ of two objects is said to be known,
but the objects themselves are absolutely unknown. But how can we know
any relation except by an ac