ier assemblage of the Thirty-ninth Congress than
that already provided by the Constitution had been discussed to a
very considerable extent among the members of the Thirty-eighth, as its
final adjournment (March 3, 1865) approached. The rebellion seemed
tottering to its fall, and it was the belief of many of the leading men
both of the Senate and the House, that it might be a special advantage
if Congress should be in session when the final surrender of the
Confederate forces should be made. But the prevailing opinion was in
favor of leaving the matter to Mr. Lincoln's discretion. It was felt
by the members that if the situation should demand the presence of
Congress, Mr. Lincoln would promptly issue his proclamation, and if the
situation should not demand it, the presence of Congress might prove
hurtful, and would certainly not be helpful. The calamity of Mr.
Lincoln's death had never entered into the public mind, and therefore
no provision was made with any view of its remotest possibility.

Mr. Johnson, however, is scarcely to be blamed for not calling an extra
session of Congress. Aside from his confidence in his own power to
deal with the problems before him, he shared, no doubt, in the general
dislike which Presidents in recent years have shown for extra sessions.
Indeed, to the Executive Department of the Government, Congress, even
in its regular sessions, is a guest whose coming is not welcomed with
half the heartiness with which its departure is speeded. But an
extra session, especially at the beginning of an Administration, is
looked upon with almost superstitious aversion, and is always to be
avoided if possible. It was remembered that all the woes of the
elder Adams' Administration, all the intrigues which the choleric
President fancied that Hamilton was carrying on against him in
connection with our French difficulties, had their origin in the extra
session of May, 1797. It was remembered also that the unpopularity
which attached to the Presidency of Mr. Madison was connected with the
two extra sessions which his timid Administration was perhaps too ready
to assemble. So deeply was the hostility to extra sessions implanted
in the minds of political leaders by the misfortunes of Adams and
Madison that another was not called for a quarter of a century. In
September, 1837, Mr. Van Buren inaugurated the ill-fortune of his
Administration by assembling Congress three months in advance of its
regular ses