cussion of it could have no effect other
than the mischievous one of dividing friends. As yet, whatever it may
become, the question is bad as the basis of a controversy--a merely
pernicious abstraction. We all agree that the seceded States, so
called, are out of their proper practical relation with the Union, and
that the sole object of the Government is to get them back into their
proper practical relation. I believe it is easier to do this without
deciding or even considering whether those States have ever been out of
the Union. The States finding themselves once more at home, it would
seem immaterial to me to inquire whether they had ever been abroad."

The essential difference between the upholders and the opponents of
this theory was not shown in the practical treatment proposed for the
States which had been in rebellion. It was in truth a difference only
in degree. The stoutest defenders of the dogma that the States had
not been out of the Union did not propose to permit the re-organization
of their local governments except upon conditions prescribed by the
National authority, and did not assert the rightfulness of their
claims to representation in the Senate and House until the prescribed
conditions were complied with. Those who protested against the dogma
did not assert the right to keep the States out of the Union, but only
claimed an unrestricted power to exact as the prerequisite of
re-admission such conditions as might be deemed essential to the public
safety--especially such as would most surely prevent another rebellion
against National authority. The two schools in short marked the
dividing line between the radical and the conservative. Perhaps
another feature might still more clearly indicate the difference
between the two. The conservatives thought the process of
reconstruction could be accomplished under the sole authority and
direction of the Executive Department of the Government, while the
radicals held it to be a matter for the exclusive determination of
Congress, affirming that the President's right of intervention was
limited to approval or veto of the bills which Congress should send to
him, and to the execution of all laws which should be constitutionally
enacted.

An extra session of Congress seemed specially desirable at the time,
and had one been summoned by the President, many of the troubles
which subsequently resulted might have been averted. The propriety
of ordering an earl