ports of Northeastern France
would be unequal to our needs without much new construction. Practically
all warehouses, supply depots and regulating stations must be provided by
fresh constructions. While France offered us such material as she had to
spare after a drain of three years, enormous quantities of material had
to be brought across the Atlantic.

With such a problem any hesitation or lack of definiteness in making
plans might cause failure even with victory within our grasp. Moreover,
plans as great as our national purpose and resources would bring
conviction of our power to every soldier in the front line, to the
nations associated with us in the war, and to the enemy. The tonnage for
material for necessary construction for the supply of an army of three
and perhaps four million men would require a mammoth program of
shipbuilding at home, and miles of dock construction in France, with a
corresponding large project for additional railways and for storage
depots.

All these considerations led to the conclusion that if we were to handle
and supply the great forces deemed essential to win the war we must
utilize the southern ports of France--Bordeaux, La Pallice, St. Nazaire,
and Brest--and the comparatively unused railway systems leading therefrom
to the northeast. This would mean the use of our forces against the
enemy somewhere in that direction, but the great depots of supply must be
centrally located, preferably in the area included by Tours, Bourges, and
Chateauroux, so that our armies could be supplied with equal facility
wherever they might be serving on the western front.

To build up such a system there were talented men in the Regular Army,
but more experts were necessary than the army could furnish. Thanks to
the patriotic spirit of our people at home, there came from civil life
men trained for every sort of work involved in building and managing the
organization necessary to handle and transport such an army and keep it
supplied. With such assistance the construction and general development
of our plans have kept pace with the growth of the forces, and the
Service of Supply is now able to discharge from ships and move 45,000
tons daily, besides transporting troops and material in the conduct of
active operations.

As to organization, all the administrative and supply services, except
the Adjutant General's, Inspector General's, and Judge Advocate General's
Departments, which remain at genera