visions prepared to fill the gaps in the ranks.

Our purpose was to prepare an American force which should be able to take
the offensive in every respect. Accordingly, the development of a
self-reliant infantry by thorough drill in the use of the rifle and in
the tactics of open warfare was always uppermost. The plan of training
after arrival in France allowed a division one month for acclimatization
and instruction in small units from battalions down, a second month in
quiet trench sectors by battalion, and a third month after it came out of
the trenches when it should be trained as a complete division in war of
movement.

Very early a system of schools was outlined and started which should have
the advantage of instruction by officers direct from the front. At the
great school centre at Langres, one of the first to be organized, was the
staff school, where the principles of general staff work, as laid down in
our own organization, were taught to carefully selected officers. Men in
the ranks who had shown qualities of leadership were sent to the school
of candidates for commissions. A school of the line taught younger
officers the principles of leadership, tactics, and the use of the
different weapons. In the artillery school, at Saumur, young officers
were taught the fundamental principles of modern artillery; while at
Issoudun an immense plant was built for training cadets in aviation.
These and other schools, with their well-considered curriculums for
training in every branch of our organization, were co-ordinated in a
manner best to develop an efficient army out of willing and industrious
young men, many of whom had not before known even the rudiments of
military technique. Both Marshal Haig and General Petain placed officers
and men at our disposal for instructional purposes, and we are deeply
indebted for the opportunities given to profit by their veteran
experience.

The place the American Army should take on the western front was to a
large extent influenced by the vital questions of communication and
supply. The northern ports of France were crowded by the British Armies'
shipping and supplies while the southern ports, though otherwise at our
service, had not adequate port facilities for our purposes, and these we
should have to build. The already overtaxed railway system behind the
active front in Northern France would not be available for us as lines of
supply, and those leading from the southern