prevent this let a
person fitly qualified command the reserve, who shall by signals make
known to the general in what condition or posture the other parts of the
fleet are in, he having his station where the whole can best be
discovered, and his signals, answering the general's, may also be
discerned by the rest of the fleet.'

[2] The _Admiralty MS._ has this _Observation_: 'Unless you can
outstretch their headmost ships there is hazard in breaking through the
enemy's line, and [it] commonly brings such disorders in the line of
battle that it may be rather omitted unless an enemy press you near a
lee shore. For if, according to this instruction, when you have got the
wind you are to press the enemy, then those ships which are on each side
of them shall receive more than equal damages from each other's shot if
near, and in case the enemy but observed the seventh instruction--that
is, to tack with equal numbers with you--then is your fleet divided and
not the enemy's.

[3] The _Admiralty MS._ here inserts an additional instruction,
numbered 5, as follows: 'If in time of fight any flagship or squadron
ahead of the fleet hath an opportunity of weathering any of the enemy's
ships, they shall put abroad the same signal the general makes them for
tacking, which, if the general would have them go about, he will answer
by giving the same again, otherwise they are to continue on the same
line or station.'

_Observation_.--'For it may prove not convenient in some cases to break
the line.'

[4] The _Admiralty MS._ adds, 'And as soon as they have the wind to
observe what other signals the general makes; and in case they lose
sight of the general, they are to endeavour to press the headmost ships
of the enemy all they can, or assist any of ours that are annoyed by
them.' The whole makes Instruction VI. of the _Admiralty MS._ An
_Observation_ is attached to the old instruction as follows:--'This
signal was wanting in the battle fought 11th August, 1673. The fourth
squadron followed this instruction and got the wind of the enemy about
four in the afternoon, and kept the wind for want of another signal to
bear down upon the enemy, as Monsieur d'Estrees alleged at the council
of war the next day. For want of this the enemy left only five or six
ships to attend their motion, and pressed the other squadrons of ours to
such a degree they were forced to give way.' _Cf._ note, p. 181.

[5] The _Admiralty MS._ makes of the three paragr