hought that
the easiest and surest method of ending litigation was to commit the
decision to Heaven. In our own day, men either deny the existence
of Gods or their care of men, or maintain that they may be bribed by
attentions and gifts; and the procedure of Rhadamanthus would therefore
be out of date. When the religious ideas of mankind change, their laws
should also change. Thus oaths should no longer be taken from plaintiff
and defendant; simple statements of affirmation and denial should be
substituted. For there is something dreadful in the thought, that nearly
half the citizens of a state are perjured men. There is no objection
to an oath, where a man has no interest in forswearing himself; as, for
example, when a judge is about to give his decision, or in voting at
an election, or in the judgment of games and contests. But where
there would be a premium on perjury, oaths and imprecations should be
prohibited as irrelevant, like appeals to feeling. Let the principles of
justice be learned and taught without words of evil omen. The oaths of
a stranger against a stranger may be allowed, because strangers are not
permitted to become permanent residents in our state.
Trials in private causes are to be decided in the same manner as lesser
offences against the state. The non-attendance at a chorus or sacrifice,
or the omission to pay a war-tax, may be regarded as in the first
instance remediable, and the defaulter may give security; but if he
forfeits the security, the goods pledged shall be sold and the money
given to the state. And for obstinate disobedience, the magistrate shall
have the power of inflicting greater penalties.
A city which is without trade or commerce must consider what it will do
about the going abroad of its own people and the admission of strangers.
For out of intercourse with strangers there arises great confusion of
manners, which in most states is not of any consequence, because the
confusion exists already; but in a well-ordered state it may be a great
evil. Yet the absolute prohibition of foreign travel, or the exclusion
of strangers, is impossible, and would appear barbarous to the rest of
mankind. Public opinion should never be lightly regarded, for the many
are not so far wrong in their judgments as in their lives. Even the
worst of men have often a divine instinct, which enables them to judge
of the differences between the good and bad. States are rightly advised
when they desire to hav
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