e all virtue, and which should aim directly at
the mark. 'Very true.' The inconsistency of legislation in most states
is not surprising, when the variety of their objects is considered. One
of them makes their rule of justice the government of a class; another
aims at wealth; another at freedom, or at freedom and power; and some
who call themselves philosophers maintain that you should seek for all
of them at once. But our object is unmistakeably virtue, and virtue is
of four kinds. 'Yes; and we said that mind is the chief and ruler of the
three other kinds of virtue and of all else.' True, Cleinias; and now,
having already declared the object which is present to the mind of the
pilot, the general, the physician, we will interrogate the mind of the
statesman. Tell me, I say, as the physician and general have told us
their object, what is the object of the statesman. Can you tell me? 'We
cannot.' Did we not say that there are four virtues--courage, wisdom,
and two others, all of which are called by the common name of virtue,
and are in a sense one? 'Certainly we did.' The difficulty is, not in
understanding the differences of the virtues, but in apprehending their
unity. Why do we call virtue, which is a single thing, by the two names
of wisdom and courage? The reason is that courage is concerned with
fear, and is found both in children and in brutes; for the soul may
be courageous without reason, but no soul was, or ever will be, wise
without reason. 'That is true.' I have explained to you the difference,
and do you in return explain to me the unity. But first let us consider
whether any one who knows the name of a thing without the definition has
any real knowledge of it. Is not such knowledge a disgrace to a man of
sense, especially where great and glorious truths are concerned? and can
any subject be more worthy of the attention of our legislators than the
four virtues of which we are speaking--courage, temperance, justice,
wisdom? Ought not the magistrates and officers of the state to instruct
the citizens in the nature of virtue and vice, instead of leaving them
to be taught by some chance poet or sophist? A city which is without
instruction suffers the usual fate of cities in our day. What then shall
we do? How shall we perfect the ideas of our guardians about virtue? how
shall we give our state a head and eyes? 'Yes, but how do you apply the
figure?' The city will be the body or trunk; the best of our young men
wil