e addition of a greater number of
torpedo-tubes, and the improvement of their centralized control in the
hand of the commander at the periscope, along lines which we are now
developing, it will be possible for the submersible to achieve a
greater effectiveness in its torpedo fire. Probably torpedoes will
then be used only against the more important enemy units, such as
battleships, cruisers, and the like. To be certain of striking these
valuable targets would be worth expending a number of torpedoes in
salvo fire.

Whether the German U-boat campaign succeeds or not will be largely a
question of the number of submersibles that the Central Powers can put
into service, and to what extent the submersible will be developed
during the present war.

III

German submarines have sunk over 7,250,000 tons of the Allied
shipping. In December, 1916, it was stated in the British Parliament
that the merchant marine of Great Britain had at that time over
20,000,000 tons. Within the first three months of the unrestricted
submarine warfare, 1,100,000 tons of British shipping went to the
bottom. At this rate, England would lose 25 per cent of her merchant
marine per annum. It is for this reason that the attention of the
entire world is concentrated upon the vital problem of the submarine
menace. On land, the Central Powers are still holding their ground,
but there is a continuous increase of the forces of the Allies which
should lead finally to such a preponderance of power as will overwhelm
the forces opposed to them. The Allied armies, however, depend for
their sustenance and supplies upon the freedom of the seas. The trade
routes of the world constitute the arteries which feed the muscles of
these armies. Germany is endeavoring to cut these arteries by the
submarine. Should she even appreciably limit the supplies that cross
the ocean to the Allies, she will bring about a condition that will
make it impossible to augment their armies. In this way there will
inevitably be a deadlock, which, from the German standpoint, would be
a highly desirable consummation.

Obviously, the first method of handling the submarine problem would
be to bottle the German undersea craft in their bases. There has been
a number of proposals as to how best to accomplish this. It has been
stated that the English Navy has planted mines in channels leading
from Zeebrugge and other submarine bases; but it is necessary only to
recall the exploits of the E-11