strength
and safety; and since speed is an essential factor in circumventing
torpedo attack, new cargo-carriers should be constructed to be as fast
as is feasible.

So radically have conditions changed that to-day we have a
superabundance of useless dreadnaught power. The smaller guns of some
of these vessels, and their gun crews, would be far more useful on the
merchant vessels than awaiting the far-off day when the German fleet
shall venture forth again. The submersible must be driven below the
surface by a superiority of gunfire on the part of the merchant marine
and its patrols. In this way the submersible would be dependent upon
the torpedo alone, a weapon of distinct limitations. In order to use
it effectively, the submersible must be not more than from eight
hundred to two thousand yards from its target, and must run submerged
at reduced speed, thus greatly lessening its potentiality for
destruction. To-day, submersibles are actually running down and
destroying merchant vessels by gunfire. If merchant vessels carried
two high-speed patrol launches equipped with three-inch guns of the
Davis non-recoil type, and these vessels were lowered in the danger
zone as a convoy to the ship, such a scheme would greatly lessen the
enormous task of the present patrol. In the event of gunfire attack by
a submersible, three vessels would be on the alert to answer her fire
instead of one: an important factor in discouraging submersibles from
surface attack!

The future of the submarine campaign is of vital importance. The
prospect is not very cheerful. Laubeuf states that at the beginning of
the war Germany had not over thirty-eight submersibles. This statement
may be taken with a grain of salt; the Germans do not advertise what
they have. It is probable, however, that to-day they have not more
than two hundred submersibles in operation. Over four thousand patrol
boats are operating against this relatively small number, and yet
sinkings continue at an alarming rate. It is estimated that Germany
will be able to produce a thousand submersibles in the coming year and
man these vessels with crews from her blockaded ships. This will be a
tremendous addition to the number she has now in operation. The
greater the number of submersibles she has in action, the greater the
area the submarine campaign will cover. The number of patrol vessels
will have to be increased in direct proportion to the area of the
submarine zone. Since a large