vernment, that
imports any obligation moral or political on the part of the minority,
surely enough has been said to show that the opinion of a mere majority
does not by itself always suffice. Something more is clearly needed.

But if the opinion of a majority does not of itself constitute a public
opinion, it is equally certain that unanimity is not required. Unanimous
opinion is of no importance for our purpose, because it is perfectly
sure to be effective in any form of government, however despotic, and it
is, therefore, of no particular interest in the study of democracy.
Legislation by unanimity was actually tried in the kingdom of Poland,
where each member of the assembly had the right of _liberum veto_ on any
measure, and it prevented progress, fostered violence, and spelled
failure. The Polish system has been lauded as the acme of liberty, but
in fact it was directly opposed to the fundamental principle of modern
popular government; that is, the conduct of public affairs in accord
with a public opinion which is general, although not universal, and
which implies under certain conditions a duty on the part of the
minority to submit.

A body of men are politically capable of a public opinion only so far as
they are agreed upon the ends and aims of government and upon the
principles by which those ends shall be attained. They must be united,
also, about the means whereby the action of the government is to be
determined, in a conviction, for example, that the views of a
majority--or it may be some other portion of their numbers--ought to
prevail, and a political community as a whole is capable of public
opinion only when this is true of the great bulk of the citizens. Such
an assumption was implied, though usually not expressed in all theories
of the social compact; and, indeed, it is involved in all theories that
base rightful government upon the consent of the governed, for the
consent required is not a universal approval by all the people of every
measure enacted, but a consensus in regard to the legitimate character
of the ruling authority and its right to decide the questions that
arise.

One more remark must be made before quitting the subject of the relation
of public opinion to the opinion of the majority. The late Gabriel
Tarde, with his habitual keen insight, insisted on the importance of the
intensity of belief as a factor in the spread of opinions. There is a
common impression that public opinion depen