not warmed in winter, so that people live in a temperature
below freezing-point. Another consequence of lack of fuel was the
bursting of water-pipes, so that people in Petrograd, for the most
part, have to go down to the Neva to fetch their water--a considerable
addition to the labour of an already overworked day.

I find it difficult to believe that, if greater efficiency had existed
in the Government, the food and fuel difficulties could not have been
considerably alleviated. In spite of the needs of the army, there are
still many horses in Russia; I saw troops of thousands of horses on
the Volga, which apparently belonged to Kalmuk tribes. By the help of
carts and sledges, it ought to be possible, without more labour than
is warranted by the importance of the problem, to bring food and
timber into Moscow and Petrograd. It must be remembered that both
cities are surrounded by forests, and Moscow at least is surrounded by
good agricultural land. The Government has devoted all its best
energies hitherto to the two tasks of war and propaganda, while
industry and the food problem have been left to a lesser degree of
energy and intelligence. It is no doubt probable that, if peace is
secured, the economic problems will receive more attention than
hitherto. But the Russian character seems less adapted to steady work
of an unexciting nature than to heroic efforts on great occasions; it
has immense passive endurance, but not much active tenacity. Whether,
with the menace of foreign invasion removed, enough day-by-day
detailed energy would exist for the reorganization of industry, is a
doubtful question, as to which only time can decide.

This leads to the conclusion--which I think is adopted by most of the
leading men in Russia--that it will be very difficult indeed to save
the revolution without outside economic assistance. Outside assistance
from capitalist countries is dangerous to the principles of Communism,
as well as precarious from the likelihood of fresh causes of quarrel.
But the need of help is urgent, and if the policy of promoting
revolution elsewhere were to succeed, it would probably render the
nations concerned temporarily incapable of supplying Russian needs.
It is, therefore, necessary for Russia to accept the risks and
uncertainties involved in attempting to make peace with the Entente
and to trade with America. By continuing war, Russia can do infinite
damage to us, especially in Asia, but cannot hope, fo