th are
successful to some extent, and both to some extent disappointed. But in
a speculation concerning the nature of the Deity, there seems no place
for such notions.
_Secondly_, the equality of power is not an arbitrary assumption; it
seems to follow from the existence of the two opposing principles. For
if they are independent of one another as to existence, which they must
needs be, else one would immediately destroy the other, so must they
also, in each particular instance, be independent of each other, and
also equal each to the other, else one would have the mastery, and
the influence of the other could not be perceived. To say that in some
things the good principle prevails and in others the evil, is really
saying nothing more than that good exists here and evil there. It
does not further the argument one step, nor give anything like an
explanation. For it must always be borne in mind that the whole question
respecting the Origin of Evil proceeds upon the assumption of a wise,
benevolent and powerful Being having created the world. The difficulty,
and the only difficulty, is, how to reconcile existing evil with such
a Being's attributes; and if the Manichean only explains this by saying
the good Being did what is good, and another and evil Being did what is
bad in the universe, he really tells us nothing more than the fact; he
does not apply his explanation to the difficulty; and he supposes the
existence of a second Deity gratuitously and to no kind of purpose.
But, _thirdly_, in whatever light we view the hypothesis, it seems
exposed to a similar objection, namely, of explaining nothing in its
application, while it is wholly gratuitous in itself. It assumes, of
course, that creation was the act of the good Being; and it also assumes
that Being's goodness to have been perfect, though his power is limited.
Then as he must have known the existence of the evil principle and
foreseen the certainty of misery being occasioned by his existence, why
did he voluntarily create sentient beings, to put them, in some respects
at least, under the evil one's power, and thus be exposed to suffering?
The good Being, according to this theory, is the remote cause of the
evil which is endured, because but for his act of creation the evil
Being could have had, no subjects whereon to work mischief; so that
the hypothesis wholly fails in removing, by more than one step, the
difficulty which it was invented to solve.
_Fourthly_,
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