s infinite power could
not avoid. This is implied in the very terms of the hypothesis. It may
also be admitted that if the Deity's only object in his dispensation be
the happiness of his creatures, the same conclusion follows even without
assuming his nature to be infinitely good; for we admit what, for the
purpose of the argument, is the same thing, namely, that there entered
no evil into his design in creating or maintaining the universe. But
all this really assumes the very thing to be proved. King gets over the
difficulty and reaches his conclusion by saying, "The Deity could
have only one of two objects--his own happiness or that of his
creatures."--The skeptic makes answer, "He might have another object,
namely, the misery of his creatures;" and then the whole question is,
whether or not he had this other object; or, which is the same thing,
whether or not his nature is perfectly good. It must never be forgotten
that unless evil exists there is nothing to dispute about--the question
falls. The whole difficulty arises from the admission that evil exists,
or what we call evil, exists. From this we inquire whether or not the
author of it can be perfectly benevolent? or if he be, with what view he
has created it? This assumes him to be infinitely powerful, or at
least powerful enough to have prevented the evil; but indeed we are now
arguing with the Archbishop on the supposition that he has proved the
Deity to be of infinite power. The skeptic rests upon his dilemma, and
either alternative, limited power or limited goodness, satisfies him.
It is quite plain, therefore, that King has assumed the thing to be
proved in his first argument, or argument _a priori_. For he proceeds
upon the postulates that the Deity is infinitely good, and that he only
had human happiness in view when he made the world. Either supposition
would have served his purpose; and making either would have been taking
for granted the whole matter in dispute. But he has assumed both; and
it must be added, he has made his assumption of both as if he was only
laying down a single position. This part of the work is certainly more
slovenly than the rest. It is the third section of the first chapter.
It is certainly not from any reluctance to admit the existence of evil
that the learned author and his able commentator have been led into this
inconclusive course of reasoning. We shall nowhere find more striking
expositions of the state of things in this r
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