very reasoning concerning them.
This is not, properly speaking, an exception to the rule so much as
an explanation of it. Ideas produce the images of themselves in
new ideas; but as the first ideas are supposed to be derived from
impressions, it still remains true, that all our simple ideas proceed
either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent impressions.

This then is the first principle I establish in the science of human
nature; nor ought we to despise it because of the simplicity of its
appearance. For it is remarkable, that the present question concerning
the precedency of our impressions or ideas, is the same with what has
made so much noise in other terms, when it has been disputed whether
there be any INNATE IDEAS, or whether all ideas be derived from
sensation and reflexion. We may observe, that in order to prove the
ideas of extension and colour not to be innate, philosophers do nothing
but shew that they are conveyed by our senses. To prove the ideas
of passion and desire not to be innate, they observe that we have a
preceding experience of these emotions in ourselves. Now if we carefully
examine these arguments, we shall find that they prove nothing but that
ideas are preceded by other more lively perceptions, from which the
are derived, and which they represent. I hope this clear stating of the
question will remove all disputes concerning it, and win render this
principle of more use in our reasonings, than it seems hitherto to have
been.

SECT. II. DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

Since it appears, that our simple impressions are prior to their
correspondent ideas, and that the exceptions are very rare, method seems
to require we should examine our impressions, before we consider our
ideas. Impressions way be divided into two kinds, those Of SENSATION and
those of REFLEXION. The first kind arises in the soul originally, from
unknown causes. The second is derived in a great measure from our ideas,
and that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon the
senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure
or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken
by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call
an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul,
produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear,
which may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived
from i