tion of a mite, or even of an insect a thousand times less than a
mite. For in order to form a just notion of these animals, we must have
a distinct idea representing every part of them, which, according to the
system of infinite divisibility, is utterly impossible, and, recording
to that of indivisible parts or atoms, is extremely difficult, by reason
of the vast number and multiplicity of these parts.

SECT. II. OF THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF SPACE AND TIME.

Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, the relations,
contradictions and agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the
objects; and this we may in general observe to be the foundation of all
human knowledge. But our ideas are adequate representations of the
most minute parts of extension; and through whatever divisions and
subdivisions we may suppose these parts to be arrived at, they can never
become inferior to some ideas, which we form. The plain consequence is,
that whatever appears impossible and contradictory upon the comparison
of these ideas, must be really impossible and contradictory, without any
farther excuse or evasion.

Every thing capable of being infinitely divided contains an infinite
number of parts; otherwise the division would be stopt short by the
indivisible parts, which we should immediately arrive at. If therefore
any finite extension be infinitely divisible, it can be no contradiction
to suppose, that a finite extension contains an infinite number of
parts: And vice versa, if it be a contradiction to suppose, that
a finite extension contains an infinite number of parts, no finite
extension can be infinitely divisible. But that this latter supposition
is absurd, I easily convince myself by the consideration of my clear
ideas. I first take the least idea I can form of a part of extension,
and being certain that there is nothing more minute than this idea, I
conclude, that whatever I discover by its means must be a real quality
of extension. I then repeat this idea once, twice, thrice, &c., and find
the compound idea of extension, arising from its repetition, always
to augment, and become double, triple, quadruple, &c., till at last it
swells up to a considerable bulk, greater or smaller, in proportion as I
repeat more or less the same idea. When I stop in the addition of parts,
the idea of extension ceases to augment; and were I to carry on the
addition in infinitum, I clearly perceive, that the idea of extens