hat our works could
not stand many hours after the opening of the batteries of that
parallel, we not only continued a constant fire with all our mortars,
and every gun that could be brought to bear upon it, but a little before
daybreak on the morning of the 16th I ordered a sortie of about three
hundred fifty men, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel
Abercrombie, to attack two batteries which appeared to be in the
greatest forwardness, and to spike the guns. A detachment of guards with
the Eightieth company of grenadiers, under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Lake, attacked the one, and one of light infantry,
under the command of Major Armstrong, attacked the other, and both
succeeded in forcing the redoubts that covered them, spiking eleven
guns, and killing or wounding about one hundred of the French troops,
who had the guard of that part of the trenches, and with little loss on
our side. This action, though extremely honorable to the officers and
soldiers who executed it, proved of little public advantage, for the
cannon, having been spiked in a hurry, were soon rendered fit for
service again, and before dark the whole parallel and batteries appeared
to be nearly complete. At this time we knew that there was no part of
the whole front attacked on which we could show a single gun, and our
shells were nearly expended. I therefore had only to choose between
preparing to surrender next day or endeavoring to get off with the
greatest part of the troops, and I determined to attempt the latter.

In this situation, with my little force divided, the enemy's batteries
opened at daybreak. The passage between this place and Gloucester was
much exposed, but the boats, having now returned, they were ordered to
bring back the troops that had passed during the night, and they joined
us in the forenoon without much loss. Our works, in the mean time, were
going to ruin, and not having been able to strengthen them by an abatis,
nor in any other manner but by a slight fraising, which the enemy's
artillery were demolishing wherever they fired, my opinion entirely
coincided with that of the engineer and principal officers of the army,
that they were in many places assailable in the forenoon, and that by
the continuance of the same fire for a few hours longer they would be in
such a state as to render it desperate, with our numbers, to attempt to
maintain them. We at that time could not fire a single gun; only one
8-inch and little