y. We have an ethical interest in determining whether there be
any moral reality beneath the appearances of the world. Ethical
questions, therefore, run back into Metaphysics. If we take
Metaphysics in its widest sense as involving the idea of some ultimate
end, to the realisation of which the whole process of the world as
known to us is somehow a means, we may easily see that metaphysical
inquiry, though distinct from ethical, is its necessary
pre-supposition. The Being or Purpose of God, the great first cause,
the world as fashioned, ordered and interpenetrated by Him, and man as
conditioned by and dependent upon the Deity--are postulates of the
moral life and must be accepted as a basis of all ethical study. The
distinction between Ethics and Philosophy did not arise at once. In
early Greek speculation, almost to the time of Aristotle, Metaphysics
and Morals were not separated. And even in later times, Spinoza and to
some extent Green, though they professedly treat of Ethics, hardly
dissociate metaphysical from ethical considerations. Nor is that to be
wondered at when men are dealing with the first principles of all being
and life. Our view of God and of the {19} world, our fundamental
_Welt-Anschauung_ cannot but determine our view of man and his moral
life. In every philosophical system from Plato to Hegel, in which the
universe is regarded as having a rational meaning and ultimate end, the
good of human beings is conceived as identical with, or at least as
included in the universal good.
2. But if a sound metaphysical basis be a necessary requisite for the
adequate consideration of Ethics, _Psychology_ as the science of the
human soul is so vitally connected with Ethics, that the two studies
may almost be treated as branches of one subject. An Ethic which takes
no account of psychological assumptions would be impossible.
Consciously or unconsciously every treatment of moral subjects is
permeated by the view of the soul or personality of man which the
writer has adopted, and his meaning of conduct will be largely
determined by the theory of human freedom and responsibility with which
he starts. Questions as to character and duty invariably lead to
inquiries as to certain states of the agent's mind, as to the functions
and possibilities of his natural capacities and powers. We cannot
pronounce an action morally good or bad until we have determined the
extent and limits of his faculties and have inves
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