of the conscience is contained in Romans
ii. 14, 15, where he speaks of the Gentiles being 'a law unto
themselves,' inasmuch as they possess a 'law written in their hearts,'
'their conscience bearing witness, therewith accusing or excusing
them.' The idea underlying the passage is the responsibility of all
men for their actions, their condemnation in sin, and their acceptance
in righteousness. This applies to Gentiles as well as Jews, and it
applies to them because, though they have not the explicit revelation
of the law, they have a revelation of the good in their hearts. The
passage therefore teaches two things: (1) That man has received a {72}
revelation of good sufficient at all stages of his history to make him
morally responsible; and (2) That man possesses a moral faculty which
indeed is not a separate power, but the whole moral consciousness or
personality in virtue of which he recognises and approves of the good
which, either as the law written in his heart or as the law
communicated in the Decalogue, has been revealed to him, and by whose
authority he judges himself.
II. _Nature, and Origin of Conscience_.--While experience seems to
point to the existence of something in man witnessing to the right,
there is great diversity of view as to the nature of this moral
element. The word 'Conscience' stands for a concept whose meaning is
far from well defined, and the lack of definiteness has left its trace
upon ethical theories. While some moralists assign conscience to the
rational or intellectual side of man, and make it wholly a faculty of
judgment; others attribute it to feeling or impulse, and make it a
sense of pleasure or pain; others again associate it more closely with
the will, and regard its function to be legislative or imperative.
These differences of opinion reveal the complexity of the nature of
conscience. The fact is, that it belongs to all these departments--the
intellectual, emotional, and volitional--and ought to be regarded not
as a single faculty distinct from the particular decisions, motives,
and acts of man, not as an activity foreign to the ego, but as the
expression of the whole personality. The question of the origin of
conscience, though closely connected with its nature, is for ethics
only of secondary importance. It is desirable, however, to indicate
the two main theories which have been held regarding its genesis.
While there are several varieties, they may be divided broadly
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