from the mechanical theory of life and as a witness to moral {91} freedom
and Christian hope. But so far from proving the sovereignty and autonomy
of the will, it discloses rather the possibilities of its abject bondage
and thraldom.

No one can doubt the facts which Professor James and others, working from
the side of religious psychology, have recently established, or discredit
the instances of conversion to which the annals of the Christian life so
abundantly testify. But even conversion must not be regarded as a change
without motives. There must be some connection between motive, character
and act, otherwise the new spiritual experience would be simply a magical
happening lacking all moral significance. If there were no continuity of
consciousness, if I could be something to-day irrespective of what I was
yesterday, then all we signify by contrition, penitence, and shame would
have no real meaning. Even the grace of God works through natural
channels and human influences. The past is not so much obliterated, as
taken up into the new life and transfigured with a new value.

The truth of spontaneity and initiative in life has lately found in M.
Bergson a fresh and vigorous advocacy, and we cannot be too grateful to
that profound thinker for his reassertion of some neglected aspects of
freedom and his philosophical vindication of the doctrine which puts it
in a new position of prominence and security. 'Life is Creation.'
'Reality is a perpetual growth, a Creation pursued without end.' 'Our
will performs this miracle.' 'Every human work in which there is
invention, every movement that manifests spontaneity brings something new
into the world. In the composition of the work of genius, as in a simple
free decision, we create what no mere assemblage of materials could have
given.'[9] But yet he says that 'life cannot create absolutely because
it is confronted with matter. . . . But it seizes upon this matter which
is necessity itself, and strives to introduce into it the greatest
possible amount of indetermination and liberty.'[10] Even Bergson,
though he emphasises so strongly immediacy and incalculableness in {92}
all human action, cannot deny that the bodily arrangements and mechanisms
are at least the basis of the working of the soul. Man cannot produce
any change in the world except in strict co-ordination with the forces
and qualities of material things. The idea in his consciousness is
powerless save