pressed in statistical units." Nor can he
accept the ancestral law, because he has convinced himself that some
ancestors contribute nothing in regard to certain characters.

The contrast between Galtonism and Mendelism may be illustrated by an
example, which, if not a strict analogy, has in it something
illuminating, especially for those who do not know too much of the
subject. Galton seems to me like a mediaeval chemist, while Mendel is a
modern one. Galton can observe, or can follow the changes that occur
when two compounds are mixed. But he knows nothing of the mechanism of
what occurs. But the Mendelian is like a modern chemist who calls the
chemical elements to his aid, and is able to express the result of the
experiment in terms of these elements. This is an enormous advantage,
and if my analogy is to be trusted, it would seem as though a progressive
study of heredity must necessarily be on Mendelian lines.

But it obviously does not follow that the laborious and skilful work of
Galton and his school is wasted. Those who wish to have made plain to
them how Biometrics may illuminate a problem which cannot as yet be
solved in Mendelian fashion, should read Dr. Schuster's most interesting
book on eugenics. I am thinking especially of the question as to the
heredity of tuberculosis and cancer. The relation between Galtonism and
Mendelism is also well and temperately discussed in the late Mr. Lock's
_Recent Progress in the Study of Variation_, 1906.

But it is time to speak of Galton as a eugenist--on which if we look to
the distant future his fame will rest. For no one can doubt that the
science of eugenics must become a great and beneficent force in the
evolution of man.

We must be persistent in urging its value, but we must also be patient.
We should remember how young is the subject. As recently as 1901 Galton
was, in his Huxley Lecture, compelled to speak of eugenics in these
terms: {30}

"It has not hitherto been approached along the ways that recent knowledge
has laid open, and it occupies in consequence a less dignified position
in scientific estimation than it might. It is smiled at as most
desirable in itself, and possibly worthy of academic discussion, but
absolutely out of the question as a practical problem." After explaining
that the object of his discourse was to "show cause for a different
opinion," he goes on with what, in his restrained style, is strong
language: "I shall show that