General
Russky (which we will call the second army), crossed the frontier.
Its right occupied Sokal, its centre left moved in line with the right
upon von Auffenberg's force directly before it.

The Russian mobilization had proceeded at a greater pace than the
enemy had allowed for. The Russian numbers expected in this field
appeared in far greater strength than this expectation had allowed
for, and it was soon apparent that von Auffenberg's command would have
to resist very heavy pressure.

But it would be an error to imagine, as was too hastily concluded in
the press of Western Europe at the time, that this pressure upon the
front of the second Austrian army, with its dogged day after day
fighting and mile by mile advance, was the principal deciding factor
in the issue. That deciding factor was, in fact, the appearance upon
the right flank of von Auffenberg of yet another Russian army (which
we will call the third) under Brussilov. It was the menace of this
force, unexpected, or at least unexpected in its great strength, which
really determined the issue, though this was again affected by the
tardiness of the Austrian retirement. Russky's direct advance upon
the front of his enemy extended for a week. It had begun when it had
destroyed the frontier posts upon Friday, the 14th. It was continued
until the evening of the succeeding Thursday, regularly, slowly, but
without intermission. It stood upon the Friday, the 21st--the day on
which the first shots were fired at the main Franco-British forces in
the West, and the day on which the first shell fell into Charleroi
station--not more than one day's cavalry advance from the outer works
of Lemberg, but it was just in that week-end that the pressure of
Brussilov began to be felt.

This third Russian army had come up from the south-east, supplied by
the main Odessa railway through Tarnopol. It was manifestly
threatening the right flank of von Auffenberg, and if a guess may be
hazarded upon operations on which we have so little detail as yet, and
which took place so far from our own standpoint, the error of the
Austrian general seems to have consisted in believing that he could
maintain himself against this flank attack. If this were the case (and
it is the most probable explanation of what followed), the error
would have been due to the same cause which affected all Austrian
plans in these first days of the war--the mistake as to the rapidity
with which Russia would com