ts, for a proof of the German power
to withstand the dreaded pressure of the Russian from the East.

It was to be expected, therefore, that two strategical consequences
would flow from these non-strategical conditions: first, that the
Russians would be tempted--though, no doubt, in very small force for
such a secondary operation--to raid a district towards which the
enemy's opinion was so sensitive; secondly, that enemy would be
tempted, after each such effort, to extend a disproportionate force in
ridding the country of such raids.

The Germans, for all the dictates of pure strategics, would hardly
hold firm under the news that Slav soldiers were in the farms and
country-houses, and were threatening the townsfolk of East Prussia.
The Russians, though no direct advantage was to be gained, and though
the bulk of their force must be used elsewhere, would certainly be
drawn to move into East Prussia in spite of the known and peculiarly
heavy difficulties to an advance which that province presented.

What were those difficulties?

They were of two kinds, the second of which has been, perhaps, unduly
emphasized at the expense of the first.

The first was, that the Baltic extreme of this region lay at the very
end of the longest possible line the Russians could move on. Even
supposing their front extended (as soon it did) from the Carpathians
to the sea, this Baltic piece was the end of the line and farthest
from their material bases and their sources of equipment. It was badly
served with railways, difficult of access from the soil lying to the
east, and backed by that sparsely inhabited belt of Russian territory
in which the modern capital of St. Petersburg has been artificially
erected, but which is excentric to the vital process of Russia. As a
fact, even after eight months of war, let alone in the first phases
which we are here about to describe, the extreme end of this line was
not attempted by the Russians at all.

Next to this extreme position, which was the first handicap, comes the
region of the lakes, the nature of which was the second handicap.

The Masurian Lake district can best be appreciated by some description
of its geology and its landscape. It was probably moulded by the work
of ice in the past. Great masses of ice have ground out, in their very
slow progress towards the sea over the very slight incline northwards
of that line, hollows innumerable, and varying from small pools to
considerable lakes