examine what is to be done
after the loss of a great battle, if we bring under review the resources
which still remain, even in the most desperate cases, if we should
express a belief in the possibility of retrieving all, even in such a
case; it must not be supposed we mean thereby that the effects of such a
defeat can by degrees be completely wiped out, for the forces and means
used to repair the disaster might have been applied to the realisation
of some positive object; and this applies both to the moral and physical
forces.

Another question is, whether, through the loss of a great battle, forces
are not perhaps roused into existence, which otherwise would never have
come to life. This case is certainly conceivable, and it is what has
actually occurred with many Nations. But to produce this intensified
reaction is beyond the province of military art, which can only take
account of it where it might be assumed as a possibility.

If there are cases in which the fruits of a victory appear rather of a
destructive nature in consequence of the reaction of the forces which it
had the effect of rousing into activity--cases which certainly are very
exceptional--then it must the more surely be granted, that there is a
difference in the effects which one and the same victory may produce
according to the character of the people or state, which has been
conquered.

CHAPTER XI. THE USE OF THE BATTLE (continued)

WHATEVER form the conduct of War may take in particular cases, and
whatever we may have to admit in the sequel as necessary respecting it:
we have only to refer to the conception of War to be convinced of what
follows:

1. The destruction of the enemy's military force, is the leading
principle of War, and for the whole chapter of positive action the
direct way to the object.

2. This destruction of the enemy's force, must be principally effected
by means of battle.

3. Only great and general battles can produce great results.

4. The results will be greatest when combats unite themselves in one
great battle.

5. It is only in a great battle that the General-in-Chief commands in
person, and it is in the nature of things, that he should place more
confidence in himself than in his subordinates.

From these truths a double law follows, the parts of which mutually
support each other; namely, that the destruction of the enemy's military
force is to be sought for principally by great battles, and their
result