tour; in such a case
circumstances are different, and success is not uncommon. But there is
one condition requisite to the success of this race of two Corps for an
object, which is that a Division of the pursuing army should follow
by the same road which the pursued has taken, in order to pick up
stragglers, and keep up the impression which the presence of the enemy
never fails to make. Bluecher neglected this in his, in other respects
unexceptionable, pursuit after La Belle Alliance.

Such marches tell upon the pursuer as well as the pursued, and they
are not advisable if the enemy's Army rallies itself upon another
considerable one; if it has a distinguished General at its head, and if
its destruction is not already well prepared. But when this means can be
adopted, it acts also like a great mechanical power. The losses of the
beaten Army from sickness and fatigue are on such a disproportionate
scale, the spirit of the Army is so weakened and lowered by the constant
solicitude about impending ruin, that at last anything like a well
organised stand is out of the question; every day thousands of prisoners
fall into the enemy's hands without striking a blow. In such a season
of complete good fortune, the conqueror need not hesitate about dividing
his forces in order to draw into the vortex of destruction everything
within reach of his Army, to cut off detachments, to take fortresses
unprepared for defence, to occupy large towns, &c. &c. He may do
anything until a new state of things arises, and the more he ventures in
this way the longer will it be before that change will take place. There
is no want of examples of brilliant results from grand decisive
victories, and of great and vigorous pursuits in the wars of Buonaparte.
We need only quote Jena 1806, Ratisbonne 1809, Leipsic 1813, and Belle-
Alliance 1815.

CHAPTER XIII. RETREAT AFTER A LOST BATTLE

IN a lost battle the power of an Army is broken, the moral to a greater
degree than the physical. A second battle unless fresh favourable
circumstances come into play, would lead to a complete defeat, perhaps,
to destruction. This is a military axiom. According to the usual course
the retreat is continued up to that point where the equilibrium of
forces is restored, either by reinforcements, or by the protection
of strong fortresses, or by great defensive positions afforded by the
country, or by a separation of the enemy's force. The magnitude of the
losses sustaine