think, therefore, that under our conditions, as well as in all
similar ones, the superiority at the decisive point is a matter of
capital importance, and that this subject, in the generality of cases,
is decidedly the most important of all. The strength at the decisive
point depends on the absolute strength of the Army, and on skill in
making use of it.

The first rule is therefore to enter the field with an Army as strong
as possible. This sounds very like a commonplace, but still it is really
not so.

In order to show that for a long time the strength of forces was by no
means regarded as a chief point, we need only observe, that in most,
and even in the most detailed histories of the Wars in the eighteenth
century, the strength of the Armies is either not given at all, or
only incidentally, and in no case is any special value laid upon it.
Tempelhof in his history of the Seven Years' War is the earliest writer
who gives it regularly, but at the same time he does it only very
superficially.

Even Massenbach, in his manifold critical observations on the Prussian
campaigns of 1793-94 in the Vosges, talks a great deal about hills and
valleys, roads and footpaths, but does not say a syllable about mutual
strength.

Another proof lies in a wonderful notion which haunted the heads of many
critical historians, according to which there was a certain size of an
Army which was the best, a normal strength, beyond which the forces in
excess were burdensome rather than serviceable.(*)

(*) Tempelhof and Montalembert are the first we recollect as
examples--the first in a passage of his first part, page
148; the other in his correspondence relative to the plan of
operations of the Russians in 1759.

Lastly, there are a number of instances to be found, in which all the
available forces were not really brought into the battle,(*) or into the
War, because the superiority of numbers was not considered to have that
importance which in the nature of things belongs to it.

(*) The Prussians at Jena, 1806. Wellington at Waterloo.

If we are thoroughly penetrated with the conviction that with a
considerable superiority of numbers everything possible is to be
effected, then it cannot fail that this clear conviction reacts on the
preparations for the War, so as to make us appear in the field with
as many troops as possible, and either to give us ourselves the
superiority, or at least to guard against the enemy o