y not to be overlooked, it is the CONTINUAL DEVELOPMENT OF
NEW FORCES. This is also the subject of another chapter, and we only
refer to it here in order to prevent the reader from having something in
view of which we have not been speaking.

We now turn to a subject very closely connected with our present
considerations, which must be settled before full light can be thrown on
the whole, we mean the STRATEGIC RESERVE.

CHAPTER XIII. STRATEGIC RESERVE

A RESERVE has two objects which are very distinct from each other,
namely, first, the prolongation and renewal of the combat, and secondly,
for use in case of unforeseen events. The first object implies the
utility of a successive application of forces, and on that account
cannot occur in Strategy. Cases in which a corps is sent to succour a
point which is supposed to be about to fall are plainly to be placed
in the category of the second object, as the resistance which has to
be offered here could not have been sufficiently foreseen. But a corps
which is destined expressly to prolong the combat, and with that object
in view is placed in rear, would be only a corps placed out of reach
of fire, but under the command and at the disposition of the General
Commanding in the action, and accordingly would be a tactical and not a
strategic reserve.

But the necessity for a force ready for unforeseen events may also
take place in Strategy, and consequently there may also be a strategic
reserve, but only where unforeseen events are imaginable. In tactics,
where the enemy's measures are generally first ascertained by direct
sight, and where they may be concealed by every wood, every fold of
undulating ground, we must naturally always be alive, more or less,
to the possibility of unforeseen events, in order to strengthen,
subsequently, those points which appear too weak, and, in fact, to
modify generally the disposition of our troops, so as to make it
correspond better to that of the enemy.

Such cases must also happen in Strategy, because the strategic act is
directly linked to the tactical. In Strategy also many a measure is
first adopted in consequence of what is actually seen, or in consequence
of uncertain reports arriving from day to day, or even from hour
to hour, and lastly, from the actual results of the combats it is,
therefore, an essential condition of strategic command that, according
to the degree of uncertainty, forces must be kept in reserve against
future