'mere matter' the second. The 'Shepherd'
plainly tells us mind is a _primary_ and matter a _secondary_ existence.
Having conjured up an Universal Mind God, it was natural he should try
to establish the supremacy of mind--but though a skilful logician he
will be unable to do so. Experience is against him. On experience of
natural operations Materialists base their conclusion that matter
without mind is possible, and mind without matter is impossible. It has
been proved that even the modification of mind called imagination is
indebted for all its images, yea, for its very existence as imagination,
to the material world.

D'Alembert states in the Discourse prefixed to the French Encyclopaedia
that 'the objects about which our minds are occupied are either
spiritual or material, and the media employed for this purpose are our
ideas either directly received or derived from reflection'--which
reflection he tells us 'is of two kinds, according as it is employed in
reasoning on the objects of our direct ideas, or in studying them as
models for imitation.' And then he tells us 'the imagination is a
creative faculty, and the mind, before it attempts to create, begins by
reasoning upon what it sees and knows.' He lauds the metaphysical
division of things into Material and Spiritual, appending however to
such laudation these remarkable words--'With the Material and Spiritual
classes of existence, philosophy is equally conversant; but as for
imagination, her imitations are imitations entirely confined to the
material world.'

Des Cartes, in his second 'Meditation,' says--_Imaginari nihil aliud est
quam rei corporeos figuram seu imaginem contemplari_--which sentence
indicates that he agreed with D'Alembert as to the exclusive limitation
of imagination to things material and sensible.

The same opinion seems to have been held by Locke, who in the concluding
chapter of his 'Essay on the Human Understanding,' states as something
certain, and therefore beyond dispute, that 'the understanding can only
compass, first--the nature of things as they are in themselves, their
relations and manner of operation--or secondly, that which man ought to
do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end,
especially happiness--or thirdly, the ways and means by which the
knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and
communicated.'

Adam Smith too, in book 5, c. 1, of his 'Wealth of Nations,' assures us
the anci