a living creature, and full of fear ran back among his
neighbours, exclaiming that he had seen a most marvellous thing, for
which he could conceive of no better name than CLICKMITOAD. After
recovering from their surprise and terror, this 'bold peasant' and his
neighbours, all armed with pokers or ether formidable weapons, crept up
to the ill-starred ticker, and smashed it to pieces.

The moral of this anecdote is no mystery. Our clickmitoadist had never
seen watches, knew nothing about watches, and hearing as well as seeing
one for the first time, naturally judged it must be an animal. Readers
who may feel inclined to laugh at his simplicity, should ask themselves
whether, if accustomed to see watches growing upon watch trees, they
would feel more astonished than they usually do when observing crystals
in process of formation, or cocoa-nuts growing upon cocoa-nut trees; and
if as inexperienced with respect to watches, or works of art, more or
less analogous to watches, they would not under his circumstances have
acted very much as he did. Admirably is it said in the unpublished work
before referred to, that the analogy which theologians attempt to
establish between the contrivances of human art and the various
existences of the universe is inadmissable. We attribute these effects
to human intelligence, because we know beforehand that human
intelligence is capable of producing them. Take away this knowledge, and
the grounds of our reasoning will be destroyed. Our entire ignorance
therefore of the Divine Nature leaves this analogy defective in its most
essential point of comparison.

Supposing, however, that theologians were to succeed in establishing an
analogy between 'the contrivances of human art and the various
existences of the universe,' is it not evident that Spinoza's axiom--of
things which having nothing in common one cannot be the cause of the
others--is incompatible with belief in the Deity of our Thirty-Nine
Articles, or, indeed, belief in _any_ unnatural Designer or Causer of
Material Nature. Only existence can have anything in common with
existence.

Now an existence, properly so called, must have at least two attributes,
and whatever exhibits two or more attributes is matter. The two
attributes necessary to existence are solidity and extension. Take from
matter these attributes, and matter itself vanishes. This fact was
specially testified to by Priestley, who acknowledged the primary truths
of Materia