e our knowledge is
intuition comprehended under conception, we cannot have any knowledge of
that which is not received into the imaginary recipients of time and
space, and consequently God is not an entity.

'But here comes the jugglery--reason forms the idea of the soul or a
substance out of nature, by connecting substance and accident into
infinite and absolute substance. What is that verbiage, but that the
reason gives the name of soul to something that does not exist at all?'

'Reason forms the idea of God or of Supreme Intelligence out of Nature,
by connecting action and reaction into infinite and absolute
concurrence. What is God out of Nature? Where is out? Where is God? What
is God?--an absolute nothing.'

'For an imagination to exist there must be two properties or qualities
coming in contact with each other to produce that imagination. For these
two properties or qualities to exist there must be matter for them to
exist in; and for matter to exist there must be space for it to exist
in, and so on. Matter might exist without two different properties to
produce an imagination; but neither two properties nor one property can
exist without matter for it to exist in. Man may exist for a time as he
does when he is dead without an imagination; but the imagination cannot
exist without the material man. Matter cannot become non-existent, but
the imagination can and does become so. Matter therefore is the reality
and the imagination a nonentity, an unsubstantial idea; or an
imagination only.' [52:1]

The anonymous writer of the passages here given within inverted commas
clearly draws the line of demarcation between the real and the unreal.
His remarks on imagination are specially important. Theologians do not
seem to be aware that imagination is a modification of mind, and mind
itself a modification of sensibility--no sensations--no thought--no
life. Though awkwardly expressed, there is truth in the dogma of
Gassendi--_ideas are only transformed sensations._ All attempts to
conceive sensibility without organs of sense are vain. As profitably
might we labour to think of motion where nothing exists to be moved, as
sensibility where there is no organ of sense. We often see organs void
of sensibility, but who ever saw, or who can imagine sensibility
independent of organs? Pantheists and other Divinitarians write about
mind as if it were an existence; nay, they claim, for it the first place
among existences, according to