ors and their powers and duties, its
fundamental articles, especially that to establish agencies in any part
of the Union, the corporate powers and business of such agencies, the
prohibition of Congress to establish any other corporation with similar
powers for twenty years, with express reservation in the same clause
to modify or create any bank for the District of Columbia, so that the
aggregate capital shall not exceed five millions, without enumerating
other features which are equally distinctive and characteristic, clearly
show that it can not be regarded as other than a bank of the United
States, with powers seemingly more limited than have heretofore been
granted to such an institution. It operates _per se_ over the Union by
virtue of the unaided and, in my view, assumed authority of Congress
as a national legislature, as distinguishable from a bank created by
Congress for the District of Columbia as the local legislature of the
District. Every United States bank heretofore created has had power to
deal in bills of exchange as well as local discounts. Both were trading
privileges conferred, and both were exercised by virtue of the aforesaid
power of Congress over the whole Union. The question of power remains
unchanged without reference to the extent of privilege granted. If this
proposed corporation is to be regarded as a local bank of the District
of Columbia, invested by Congress with general powers to operate over
the Union, it is obnoxious to still stronger objections. It assumes that
Congress may invest a local institution with general or national powers.
With the same propriety that it may do this in regard to a bank of the
District of Columbia it may as to a State bank. Yet who can indulge the
idea that this Government can rightfully, by making a State bank its
fiscal agent, invest it with the absolute and unqualified powers
conferred by this bill? When I come to look at the details of the bill,
they do not recommend it strongly to my adoption. A brief notice of some
of its provisions will suffice.

First. It may justify substantially a system of discounts of the most
objectionable character. It is to deal in bills of exchange drawn in one
State and payable in another without any restraint. The bill of exchange
may have an unlimited time to run, and its renewability is nowhere
guarded against. It may, in fact, assume the most objectionable form of
accommodation paper. It is not required to rest on any actu