g
them to feel their way with caution. For the first eight years of the
existence of the late Bank of the United States its circulation barely
exceeded $4,000,000, and for five of its most prosperous years it was
about equal to $16,000,000; furthermore, the authority given to receive
private deposits to a limited amount and to issue certificates in such
sums as may be called for by the depositors may so far fill up the
channels of circulation as greatly to diminish the necessity of any
considerable issue of Treasury notes. A restraint upon the amount of
private deposits has seemed to be indispensably necessary from an
apprehension, thought to be well founded, that in any emergency of trade
confidence might be so far shaken in the banks as to induce a withdrawal
from them of private deposits with a view to insure their unquestionable
safety when deposited with the Government, which might prove eminently
disastrous to the State banks. Is it objected that it is proposed to
authorize the agencies to deal in bills of exchange? It is answered that
such dealings are to be carried on at the lowest possible premium, are
made to rest on an unquestionably sound basis, are designed to reimburse
merely the expenses which would otherwise devolve upon the Treasury, and
are in strict subordination to the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of the Bank of Augusta against Earle, and other reported cases, and
thereby avoids all conflict with State jurisdiction, which I hold to be
indispensably requisite. It leaves the banking privileges of the States
without interference, looks to the Treasury and the Union, and while
furnishing every facility to the first is careful of the interests of
the last. But above all, it is created by law, is amendable by law, and
is repealable by law, and, wedded as I am to no theory, but looking
solely to the advancement of the public good, I shall be among the very
first to urge its repeal if it be found not to subserve the purposes and
objects for which it may be created. Nor will the plan be submitted in
any overweening confidence in the sufficiency of my own judgment, but
with much greater reliance on the wisdom and patriotism of Congress.
I can not abandon this subject without urging upon you in the most
emphatic manner, whatever may be your action on the suggestions which
I have felt it to be my duty to submit, to relieve the Chief Executive
Magistrate, by any and all constitutional means, from a con